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ABSTRACT 
Studies of the factors involved in public perceptions of CO2 storage projects reveal 
a level of complexity and diversity that arguably confounds a comprehensive 
theoretical account.  To some extent, a conceptual approach that simply organises 
the relevant social scientific knowledge thematically, rather than seeking an 
integrated explanation, is as useful as any single account that fails to do justice to 
the contingencies involved. This paper reviews and assembles such knowledge in 
terms of six themes and applies these themes to five European cases of carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) implementation. We identify the main factors involved 
in community responses to CCS as relating to: the characteristics of the project; 
the engagement process; risk perceptions; the actions of the stakeholders; the 
characteristics of the community, and the socio-political context. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Governments and companies in many countries are investing in Carbon Capture and 
Storage projects (CCS). The separation and compression of CO2 from power and 
industrial plants and its disposal in saline aquifers, depleted oil or gas fields has 
become seen in many quarters as one of the key climate change mitigation options [1]. 
Pilot, demonstration and industrial projects have been initiated in the last few years 
around the world [2]. Although some have questioned whether storing carbon 
emissions should be an option to tackle climate change, given the existence of other 
options and the potential risks of CCS [3], governments in the European Union and 
other countries are nonetheless stimulating the commercial deployment of CCS [4]. 
Public perceptions and acceptance of CCS has been a matter of concern for policy 
and business communities [5, 6, 7], given their potential effects on the successful 
deployment of the technology. The topic has been also a matter of research for social 
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scientists interested in how the different publics and social groups perceive the 
technology (for recent introductory reviews, see e.g. [8, 9]). Understanding social 
perceptions of a technology is of use both in pragmatic terms (to improve 
communication efforts and decisions) and in normative terms (governmental and 
corporate decision making should arguably incorporate, at some level, public concerns 
and views). But analysis of social reactions to CCS also needs to consider other 
dimensions. As with other energy technologies, social reactions to CCS will depend 
not only on perceptions of the technology attributes per se, but also on a wide variety 
of contextual factors [10]. These, we would suggest, include factors relating to at least 
two main levels: first the broad, socio-political level and second the community level, 
at which decisions on CO2 storage siting will take place. 
At the socio-political level, attitudes and actions from policy makers, innovation 
communities, industry actors, non- governmental associations and the general public 
may foster or discourage any particular technology development. Competition is the 
primary motor for technological development and the public often plays a minor role 
in technology decisions, especially in complex infrastructure, where elites and 
professional experts are the main institutional actors who make choices among 
technologies [11]. But, as found in other contexts, many of the barriers for achieving 
successful projects are sometimes a manifestation of lack of social acceptance [12]. 
It is at the community level where most of the perceived environmental and public 
health issues and concerns around CO2 storage will be concentrated. During the period 
2009-11,  community  reactions  to  CCS  projects  have  been  responsible  for  the 
cancellation of, or threat to, several CO2 storage projects internationally, underlying 
the importance of taking into account potential local reactions [13]. Controversies 
around the siting of hazardous facilities have been frequent in the political life of most 
technologically advanced industrial societies in the last 30 years [14, 15]. The roots of 
these controversies may be found in deeper socio-economic, cultural and political 
changes in advanced societies, a combination of policies poorly designed and ham- 
handedly implemented [14] with a public anxious about health, safety and 
environmental issues [16] and higher levels of mistrust in risk management authorities 
modulated by risk amplification process. 
To reduce the prospects of local opposition to CO2 storage project, agencies and 
research institutes have developed guides on best practices for public communication 
and involvement around CCS [17, 18]. All these efforts recognize the importance of 
considering the siting context and the “social fit” in the planning and development of 
a CO2 storage project [13]. Accordingly, this paper examines the development of 
public reactions in relation to five European CO2 storage projects, in order to shed 
light on the factors underlying community reactions to such projects and to identify 
any lessons that may be learned for the future. To this end, we first review the wider 
literature on public responses to built infrastructure developments, in search of the 
main variables and processes identified as typically influencing their social 
acceptability. Second, we analyze five case studies of CO2 storage projects in the light 
of the reviewed literature and discuss alternative explanations for the successes and 
failures of the CO2 storage siting proposals. Full underpinning reports of our case 
studies [19, 20, 21] and complementary papers [22, 23] are also available. 
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2. THE SITING OF ENERGY FACILITIES 
Siting controversies have been the focus of social research since at least the 1980’s, 
with studies of risk communication around the siting of hazardous waste facilities and 
nuclear waste dumps [24, 25, 26]. From this early work, at least two themes emerged. 
First, the conflicts around siting (the local dimension) have played a key role in the 
deployment of new technologies in the last decades. Most notably, the history of the 
nuclear energy in the US and other countries has involved hostile local reactions acting 
to significantly impede the siting of new facilities [27]. Second, the social acceptance 
of a proposed infrastructure is not only a function of the characteristics of the 
technology or the type of facility, nor a reaction driven by egoistic motives. Rather, we 
would suggest that opposition to new infrastructure is the result of a variety of 
interacting social and psychological processes that are in turn influenced by a range of 
wider contextual factors. 
The siting literature has provided various explanations for the causes of hostile 
local reactions to technological facilities. Without intending to provide a 
comprehensive elaboration of these studies (for fuller reviews see [28] and [29]), 
explanations can be grouped into three broad categories: i) those studies focused on 
the characteristics of the technology (e.g. involving waste outputs or contentious 
inputs, scale and so on) [30]; ii) those focussing psychological processes (e.g. place 
attachment [31] and familiarity with the technology [32]); and iii) those stressing the 
importance of wider social and institutional factors (e.g. trust, equity, ownership, 
planning-related procedures, governance and accountability (e.g. [33, 34, 35]). 
One of the main contributions of the siting literature is the rejection of simplistic 
explanations of local rejection to technological facilities [36, 37, 38]. For the social 
science community working on these issues, it has become axiomatic that local 
opposition is not simply a function of the risk characteristics of a technology, or 
proximity to a development; nor can it simply be resolved through compensation or 
reward [39]. Social research has shown that local opposition is often based on distrust, 
negative reactions to the actors (developers, authorities and energy companies) 
promoting the project and to the way projects are planned and managed, rather than 
being always a response to the facility itself [40, 36, 38]. 
In short, the social embedding of a new technology is often contingent on 
situational, even perhaps randomly assorted combinations of circumstances [41]. 
Nonetheless, drawing on the broad siting literature, it is possible to identify the 
following, commonly-active factors with the potential to play a role in social 
responses to CO2 storage projects. In the sections below, and based on the reviewed 
literatures, we cluster factors (see Figure 1) largely by level and agent: that is, by the 
level at which they are operative and in relation to relevant actors and agents. 
 
2.1. Characteristics of the technology and the project 
The characteristics of the facility can play a role in how a local community reacts to a 
proposed installation. Although studies suggest that the acceptance of a facility is as 
much a function of the relationship of the facility to the community as it is the type of 
facility [32], the material characteristics of the technology and the facility can be a 
factor influencing its acceptance [30]. Some technologies and facilities may be more 
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easily associated with high risks and therefore considered unacceptable and rejected or 
even stigmatized. 
The characteristics of the concrete project may also affect local perceptions and 
reactions. In the wind energy context, visual impact has been considered a significant 
factor influencing public attitudes [40], as well as the size of wind farms, the unity 
with the landscape or the distance to population [37]. The influence of the 
characteristics of the technological facility (such as size, distance to population, colour 
or harmony with the environment) on public attitudes may vary depending on the 
technology and other contextual factors. The particular negative impacts of a 
technological facility should be taken into account in any planning process [42]. 
 
2.2. The planning process and the public engagement strategy 
The planning process is often considered one of the key elements in building 
acceptance for technological projects. The style of engagement between the project, its 
promoter and the local community often plays a major role in how the local 
community reacts to a proposed facility, though this will rarely be the only main factor 
involved. Certainly some of the failures in facility siting in the last years has been 
attributed to unfair and unproductive processes of making and implementing facility 
siting decisions [43]. As suggested by Rogers, “facilities are accepted not simply on 
the basis of the technology and its inherent risks and benefits, but rather on the broad 
full-cycle bundle of factors that characterize the relationship of the facility to the 
community” [32: 271]. Conditions such as independent monitoring, enhanced 
community control of the facility, and the power to shut the facility down tend to 
increase local acceptance of new facilities [39]. Nonetheless, when thinking about the 
planning process and the relationship of the facility to the community, we can 
differentiate between the actions taken by project promoters (compensation, 
engagement strategy, decision making) and the attitudes towards the community in 
which the facility is placed. 
Compensation (e.g. offering residents a package of benefits) can sometimes help in 
gaining public acceptance in some contexts through a more fair siting process. An 
unacceptably high ratio of local costs to local benefits may cause opposition. But other 
contextual elements may modulate its effects. Incentives are subject to serious 
limitations when facilities are perceived to be particularly risky or suspect legitimacy 
[44]. Incentives are likely to increase acceptability if risk potential is also mitigated 
[39] and safety standards and local community control are enhanced [45]. Finally, 
some people may view health and safety as rights that should never be traded off for 
material goods [46]. 
Having a proactive, carefully planned and flexible engagement strategy is also 
considered a key issue in producing a positive social reaction to facility siting. Lack 
of adequate communication and consultation with local residents by developers is 
commonly cited as one of the main reasons for opposition [47, 34, 48], but again 
communication extent and style is rarely seen as the only factor. It is widely accepted 
that the way to build trust in risk management is to listen to public concerns and 
engage in two-way communication [41]. Public engagement mechanisms are 
variously claimed to: incorporate public values into decisions; increase the substantive 
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quality of decisions; resolve conflicts among competing interests; build trust in 
organizations; and inform or educate the public [49]. Of course the level of 
engagement and the tools applied [50] may differ significantly from one project to 
another. 
Finally, the attitude of the organization towards the local community and towards 
public engagement may influence social reactions. The studies on public participation 
mechanisms show that very often the success of a participation strategy (its process 
and its outcomes) is dependent on contextual issues [51] such as the relationship 
between promoters and communities, the existence of social and economic ties and 
trusted relationships [52] or the organizational and decision making characteristics 
[53, 51]. An organization with a weak culture and custom of external participation will 
have further to go in successfully engaging than an organisation with a history of this. 
In sum, stakeholders’ and public reactions to a proposed facility may be dependent on 
the way promoters handle the planning process and respond to community needs. 
 
2.3. Risk perceptions 
In opinion-forming processes, public perceptions are both an antecedent and a 
consequence of the other factors identified here. In general, public perception of risk 
is an important factor in determining public attitudes towards new facilities and 
technologies. Research on risk perception [54, 55] has found that the differences in 
risk perception between experts and non-expert groups do not rest on a different level 
of technical knowledge, but in a different evaluation of the qualitative dimensions of 
risk, such as familiarity. Other approaches have also underlined the importance of 
cultural orientations and lifestyles [56] as well as prior attitudes [57] and emotions in 
the way individuals react to new technologies and facilities. In general the risk 
literature indicates that individual positions towards new infrastructures, technologies 
or organizations may be influenced by unconscious processes such as group and 
network influences, social identity formation processes, cultural predispositions, 
emotional responses or automatic associations. 
Perceived benefits can play also a role in driving social reactions to proposed 
facilities. Generally, people accept technology because of the benefits derived [58]. 
Lober [33], in a study on public attitudes towards waste facility siting, found that the 
installation needed to provide some form of local benefit before it would be accepted. 
Perceptions of benefits may in turn be influenced by prior attitudes and cultural 
orientations as well as group membership. While some groups may value potential 
global benefits from the facility, other publics may only value the expected local or 
personal benefits. The idea of public acceptance linked to perceived personal benefits 
has led to efforts by project developers to deliver personal benefits through financial 
compensation or community shares [59]. 
The level of trust individuals have on organizations and authorities managing 
technological projects is increasingly regarded as a significant element in the social 
reactions to technological developments and risk management [60]. Although it is 
empirically difficult to differentiate between trust and other prior attitudes [61], studies 
suggest that distrust of the developers and disbelief in the planning system have 
impeded the success of technological projects and risk communication programs [62]. 
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Trust can be created in careful decision making processes, but it can be destroyed in 
an instant by processes perceived as unfair [60, 61]. Social trust may play an important 
role in public attitudes to CCS projects, where various organizations, from private 
energy companies to local, regional and national governments and public research 
bodies are involved. As stated by Hammond and Shackley [13], CCS projects led by 
research organizations have tended to benefit from greater perceived credibility. 
Public risk perceptions are also influenced by social amplification and attenuation 
processes. Amplification by media coverage and other means of risk signal can 
significantly affect public views on specific technology projects [63]. Risks interact 
with psychological, social, institutional and cultural processes that can intensify or 
attenuate individual and social perception of risks. If an initial risk event which poses 
a hazard is followed by extensive media coverage, repeated negative imagery relating 
the place or activity, this can overturn a siting process. Amplification stations such as 
the media, opinion leaders, activist social organizations, and personal networks, play 
a significant role in framing and dramatizing the risk and establishing the symbols and 
metaphors used in characterizing the risks [63]. The battle for the amplification and 
attenuation of risk may happen also in the CCS context. 
Unfortunate events related to the project and the socio-technical context may 
increase the local concerns for safety and risks and generate an unexpected social 
reaction. As Slovic et al. [64] state, socially amplified reactions to unfortunate events 
associated with a facility (major and minor accidents, discoveries of pollutant releases, 
evidence of mismanagement, attempts to sabotage or disrupt the facility, etc.) may 
cause significant harm to a proposed project. Unfortunate events associated with other 
related projects (e.g. rejection of a similar project in another community, major 
accidents in parallel technologies, etc.) may also generate a negative public attitude 
towards the new facility. 
 
2.4. Stakeholders’ actions 
Of course it is not just psychological and social processes that are involved in siting 
controversy, but an interaction of processes of different types, on different levels. The 
actions of politicians, influential individuals, the media and representatives from local 
or national organizations can significantly affect the siting of a proposed facility. The 
strength of local opposition groups has been considered an important factor in 
strengthening distrust during the planning and siting stages [65, 66]. Environmental 
NGOs, the media and policy makers, if actively opposed to a proposed facility, can 
significantly influence public attitudes to new infrastructures. In the evaluation of the 
siting strategies of two waste incinerators, Löfstedt [65] found that a strong and 
organized opposition by environmental NGOs with high credibility in the area put the 
development organization in a defensive position and contributed to risk 
amplification, reducing public trust in the organization and eroding its credibility. This 
is a common pattern and experts and influential actors in the community (e.g. local 
politicians) who oppose or criticize a project can also significantly influence public 
reactions. This can be especially true when their voices are amplified by media 
coverage. 
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2.5. Characteristics of the community 
The characteristics of the community receiving the new facility may determine the 
social acceptance of the project. In this sense, some projects may have a better “social 
fit”, that is, a better adaptation to the characteristics of a community than others [13]. 
Communities familiar with the industrial risks may be more receptive to new 
infrastructures, deprived areas may be more positive about new facilities bringing 
economic benefits [65]. It is generally agreed that communities having a similar 
facility may be more positive to new facilities [65, 32]. The local relationships with 
the fossil fuel and energy industries; the character of a place (e.g. rural or industrial 
town); reactions to other recent infrastructural developments; and the fit of the project 
with the needs of the local economy may also determine the social fit of a CCS project 
[13]. But the contingent and uncertain nature of social reactions makes it very difficult 
to precisely determine how the characteristics of a community may influence how the 
local public and stakeholders will react to a proposed facility. In this sense, 
explanations about the social acceptance of a project based on the features of the 
community are often more ad-hoc explanations. 
 
2.6. Socio-political context 
The socio-political context ranges from the structural and institutional elements that 
affect policy decisions (policy frameworks, regulations) to the dynamic elements in 
the context (e.g. political elections, state of the economy, political controversies, shifts 
in the public opinion) that may affect the social acceptance of a project. Regarding the 
policy framework, national and local policies may affect the degree to which 
developers are dependent on community acceptance [67, 68]; the likelihood of 
establishing alternative siting processes or instituting a broad based participatory 
process. The broader socio-political context may influence how the public perceives 
the need for a proposed CO2 storage project [52]. National public debates may also 
influence local views. Political controversies in the community may also determine the 
local reaction to a facility or technology, as the project can be used for political battles. 
As Hammond and Shackley [13] suggest for CCS projects, particularly sensitive times 
such as elections can drive a negative reaction to a particular project. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Summary of factors involved in community reactions to CO2 storage site 
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3. ANALYSIS OF FIVE EUROPEAN CCS SITING PROCESSES 
In this section, we examine the factors underlying the social reactions to the siting of 
five CCS projects in Europe. The selected cases are those that were analysed by the 
authors in the context of the European project NEAR CO2 [19, 20, 21]. The cases 
represented much of the totality of CCS-related activity in Europe, at the time of the 
study. The selection allowed the existence of variation in the factors studied: public 
responses, project type, engagement processes, actions of stakeholders, the 
characteristics of the community, and socio-political context. However, the selection 
cannot claim to be representative of all cases of public responses to CCS projects 
around the world: indeed this is part of the thesis suggested here – that the search for 
a fully-applicable, comprehensive model of CCS siting controversy is something of a 
chimera due to the sheer contingency and diversity of real-world contexts. Table 1 
selectively summarizes the attributes of the five projects. 
To understand the community reactions to the CO2 storage projects, two research 
methods were used. First, interviews with the main stakeholders: local policy makers, 
officials, members of the public and environmental non-governmental organization 
(NGO) representatives. Between nine and fifteen interviews were carried out for each 
case. Interviewees were selected to be representative of a variety of stakeholders, with 
selection otherwise on a convenience sample basis – i.e. existing contacts, access 
routes and snow-balling approaches to stakeholder recruitment were used. Interviews 
were semi-structured and followed an interview guideline adapted to the project and 
stakeholder. Topics addressed in the interview included: stakeholder’s views on the 
project; their relations with and views of the other stakeholders involved; efforts 
undertaken to communicate with the other stakeholders and with the local public in 
general; and their view on the engagement process. 
Second, a complementary documentary analysis of local newspapers, project 
background information, communication materials and internet sources was 
undertaken to understand the various stakeholder perspectives on the siting and the 
dynamics of the controversy. The documents were mainly collected through internet 
sources, e.g. project web sites, internet sites of opponents, etc. Searches were also 
conducted in all the local newspapers. 
A thematic analysis of the data generated in the interviews was carried out for each 
case. The process entailed the carefully reading of data, coding generation and 
integrated analysis [69]. The results have been re-analyzed and summarized for this 
paper according to the clusters identified in the previous section, and represented in 
Figure 1: (1) the characteristics of the project; (2) the engagement processes; (3) public 
perceptions; (4) the actions of stakeholders; (5) the characteristics of the community; 
(6) the socio-political context. 
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Table 1. Attributes of the five European CCS projects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
3.1. The characteristics of the project 
Although the five cases involve on-shore storage of CO2, they differ in many aspects. 
First, while two are mainly research projects led by research organizations, three are 
demonstration projects led by the industry. The CO2 Sink project at Ketzin (Germany) 
and the Compostilla Project at Hontomín (Spain) have been aimed at the observation 
and analysis of the effects of injecting CO2 into a reservoir. Both have been 
coordinated by public research bodies - research institutions and universities. The 
exploration at Beeskow (Germany) was initiated and led by Vattenfall, supported by 
the regional government. The CCS project at Barendrecht (the Netherlands) was 
initiated by the global oil and gas company Shell in response to a tender by the 
national Government. The CCS project implemented at Be?chatów Power Plant 
(Poland) is coordinated by PGE Elektrownia Be lchatów S.A., part of PGE, a public 
company and the largest electricity group in Poland. 
Differences in the properties of the project and the type of developer may well have 
influenced local reactions to the CCS projects. The data from the interviews indicate 
that the projects at Ketzin and Hontomín were framed as promoting technological 
innovation and international scientific research by promoters, local stakeholders and 
the public. Promoters in both projects were highly trusted, as they were perceived as 
not benefiting economically from the project. Scientists have played a prominent role 
in both projects. On the contrary, in Beeskow and Barendrecht the projects have been 
promoted by large energy companies (Shell and Vattenfall) and supported by the 
national or regional governments. Public trust in Shell and Vattenfall in relation to 
these cases seems to have been low from the initial stages of the project and both 
organizations have encountered significant difficulties in building trust among local 
citizens. In Belchatów, the stakeholders opposed to the project have been successful in 
framing the CCS project as a plan that is “enforced” by the European Commission and 
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large, capitalist interest groups supported by the Polish government. 
 
3.2. The engagement process 
Promoters of the five CCS projects have tried to inform the local public and 
stakeholders about the projects through various engagement activities, as described 
below. In Barendrecht, Beeskow and Ketzin, the project developers have tried to 
comprehensively inform the local public about the projects at an early stage using 
different channels, e.g. information meetings, web pages, informal contacts. In 
Barendrecht, the ministers of Economic Affairs and Environment have also regularly 
visited the community to discuss the project with local citizens. In Belchatów, 
communication activities by PGE have exceeded formal requirements required by law. 
PGE launched a series of local meetings to introduce the CCS project to a wider 
public. The main target group of these meetings was local leaders who were asked to 
transmit information about the CCS project further to local residents. PGE also 
organized several conferences and a series of open-air meetings with local residents in 
the locations of potential carbon storage. In Hontomín, Ciuden initiated various 
informal engagement activities in the local community such as public meetings and 
interviews to introduce the project. 
There are slight, but possibly important differences among cases regarding the 
timing of the engagement process. According to our interviews, in Beeskow, the 
affected communities first learned about the project when the decision had already 
been taken to go for an exploration permit in the locality, while in Ketzin community 
representatives had been involved before any geological work began. Engagement 
with the local community in Barendrecht had started early and has been intensive 
throughout project development, but nevertheless did not provide any reassurance that 
local concerns would be taken into account. In Belchatów, the promoter tried to 
proactively inform the local communities about the state of the project before the 
storage site was decided. In the Hontomín pilot site, Ciuden adopted a proactive and 
open attitude towards the local population and stakeholders. Here, public acceptance 
was recognized as a fundamental issue. 
It is difficult to clearly identify promoters’ attitudes towards both the engagement 
process and the views of the local communities. In Barendrecht, the local views raised 
by the Municipality generated a defensive response from Shell and the National 
Government. In Ketzin and Hontomín, the social dimensions of the project have been 
considered as relevant issues in the planning process and the local communities seem 
to have been relatively satisfied with the engagement processes. In Beeskow and 
Belchatów, Vattenfall and PGE have actively contacted local groups and stakeholders 
and offered to provide information. But opponents in both cases have questioned the 
quality and purpose of the engagement. According to our interviews, in Beeskow, 
opponents considered the information provided on the project as biased, while 
opponents in Belchatów considered that engagement with the local public should have 
taken place at a much earlier stage of project development, when key decisions were 
being made. 
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3.3. Risk perceptions 
The local public and stakeholder groups at the five sites have been concerned about 
the potential impacts of CO2 storage on health, the environment and the local 
community in general. At all of the project sites, the public have expressed 
reservations about the technology (e.g. that CO2 may be toxic; the risks of storing a 
substance deep underground). Local communities are also aware that the technology 
is not fully developed and that it still involves unknowns. But the level of perceived 
risk has differed depending on the project. In Ketzin, it is stated by the interview- 
partners that the public feels safe due to the minor quantities injected and the 
expectation that the project would be stopped if there was any leakage. In Hontomín, 
interviews with key actors and members of the public showed that concerns about 
water contamination, impacts on private properties and other potential unexpected 
impacts have not become a generalised public anxiety around CCS in the locality, 
maybe due to the characteristics of the community and of the project. 
However, at Beeskow, the wider public discussion has been strongly related to the 
potential  risks  of  CO2  storage.  These  include  concerns  that  leakage  will  occur, 
possibly causing fatal accidents, the problem of controlling or removing the carbon 
once storage has started and ground water contamination e.g. by salt from the saline 
aquifer. Furthermore, opponents are afraid of negative impacts on the real estate 
market and tourism, and also argue that investments in CCS reduce the potential for 
investment in renewable energy. At Barendrecht, the potential negative impacts on 
public health as well as monitoring of the CO2 were the main public concerns. Local 
stakeholders also doubted the need for selecting their locality for storage rather than 
others. Regarding the distribution of costs and benefits, the Municipality stated that 
Barendrecht had already absorbed many infrastructural projects in recent years; that 
the risks of decreases in real estate value were unclear; and that project developers will 
hugely benefit from the project in multiple ways by obtaining government funding to 
pollute, which deviates from the ‘the polluter pays’ principle and is unfair. 
In Belchatów, the media analysis shows that perceived risks also played a role in 
the debate. These were centred on the potential for CO2 leakage; earthquakes; 
underground explosions; suffocation of humans and animals; the risk that the ground 
surface could be pushed upwards; drinking water contamination; soil contamination 
and the souring of underground waters. Also, perceived socio-economic risks of the 
CCS project focused on: potential land de-valuation within the storage area; potential 
relocation of the population from the area designated for storage; the potential to 
convert the area designated for storage into a mining area to be regulated by the 
National Mining Institute; the potential conflict between the CCS project and 
geothermal projects in the area designated for storage; and the potential increase in 
electricity prices. 
Another contested issue has been the need for the facility and how the community 
will benefit from it. While in Ketzin and Hontomín the members of the community 
interviewed seem to feel that they are benefiting from the project, as it is attracting 
visitors from all over the country and even from foreign countries, in Barendrecht, 
Beeskow and Belchatów, the local public and stakeholders perceived the project as 
unnecessary and not beneficial to the local community. In Belchatów, the potential 
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conflict between carbon storage and geothermal development became one of the main 
issues raised by the CCS opposition. 
Lack of public trust in the developers has also been a key feature of the Barendrecht 
and Beeskow projects. In Barendrecht, Shell and the national government were 
perceived as not being transparent about the potential costs, risks and benefits of the 
project; as not taking decisions with the local community; and as not taking public 
concerns into account. In short, they were not perceived as a trusted source of 
information and their efforts to provide independent and new information on the 
project were perceived as partisan. Vattenfall also experienced problems through its 
dual role of being both the main project beneficiary and the main source of 
information, for a public who had little prior knowledge of CCS or trust in the 
company. By contrast, the scientific researchers from GFZ and Ciuden in Ketzin and 
Hontomín respectively seem to be trusted by the public and by community 
representatives. 
 
3.4. The actions of the stakeholders 
The actions of various stakeholders have significantly influenced the public 
controversy around the CCS projects in Barendrecht, Beeskow and Belchatów, while 
in Ketzin and Compostilla stakeholders have adopted a more cooperative position with 
promoters. In Barendrecht, various stakeholders such as the Municipality of 
Barendrecht, representatives from the local political parties and citizens active in the 
local politics have had a role in local reactions to the project. Actions such as 
organizing public protest activities, creating a local activist group, voicing opinions in 
the media, letters of complaint about the project and demands for additional, 
independent research were all means used by stakeholders to influence the planning 
process. The Municipality of Barendrecht has also been very active in the debate 
around the planning process. In addition, local political parties have been key actors, 
organizing protest activities that received regular media attention. One of the political 
parties mobilized the public by organizing petitions and protest walks. 
In Beeskow, politicians from all political parties have declared themselves opposed 
to the project, several of them in open dissent with the official position of their 
respective party (e.g. members of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) 
party). Local councils voted against the project and officially registered their 
opposition at the Landesamt für Bergbau, Geologie und Rohstoffe (LBGR) as the 
permitting authority; several other societal stakeholders have declared their opposition 
to the project as well, e.g. farmer associations. The protests of local citizens emerged 
shortly after the announcement of the project. Local action groups were founded who 
quickly developed internet sites, put up posters all over the area and organized protest 
events. These groups have been consistently active and remained so until the 
cancellation of the project. 
In the Belchatów case, stakeholders organized opposition towards the CCS project 
in different ways. Some reactions came from local authorities – several borough 
leaders issued formal complaints and letters to the national government. In one 
particular locality – in Pabianice – politicians from the local government organized the 
Committee against CO2 Storage. The Committee was pro-active and organized four 
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meetings with local residents, during which concerns about storage safety and about 
socio-economic implications of the CCS project were raised. 
 
3.5. The characteristics of the community 
Four of the five CCS projects (Ketzin, Beeskow, Hontomín and Belchatów) have been 
sited in rural areas. But they differ in the level of local familiarity with fossil fuel 
industries. In the CO2 Sink project, the community includes the town of Ketzin as well 
as four villages and has overall about 6,500 inhabitants. Fossil fuel operations are not 
new to citizens of Ketzin, as the site now used by the research project was formerly 
used for the storage of natural gas. Regarding the pilot phase of the Compostilla 
project, the storage is located in Hontomín, a small village (80habs.) in the north of 
Burgos. The community has a high proportion of elderly residents. The area has very 
limited industrial activity. But it has had some relationship with the fossil fuel industry, 
given that small scale oil prospecting activities were developed nearby in the last 
decades. The area has been affected also by locally unwanted land uses, such as a 
factory making explosives and a recent incinerator. 
Beeskow is also a rural area not densely populated, with roughly 8,000 inhabitants, 
situated about 80 km south-east of Berlin. Industry does not play a significant role in 
the local infrastructure and the bigger cities are several kilometres away. The 
communities are trying to enhance tourism in the region, which has a high-value 
landscape covered by forests and including several small lakes and rivers. Over the 
past few years, the local council of Beeskow invested in renovating the historical town 
centre. 
In the Be lchatów project, the three potential storage sites are quite remote from Be l 
chatów. The Lutomiersk-Tuszyn area is mostly rural but its proximity to Pabianice, 
Zgierz and the Province capital lódz´ gives local authorities and residents fairly good 
access to the organizations, institutions and media of these cities. This area has also 
been recently identified as having good geothermal potential. Wojszyce is a village in 
the lódz´ Province, located further from lódz´ than Lutomiersk and Tuszyn. 
Budziszewice is also a village remote from lódz´. 
Barendrecht, the only urban area among the cases analyzed, is a town of 44,000 
people in west Netherlands, close to one of the largest industrial areas in the 
Netherlands [70]. Barendrecht is a densely populated area, mainly populated by 
middle class families and with a high proportion of middle aged citizens and children. 
In recent years, the municipality of Barendrecht has witnessed a number of major 
infrastructure projects, including the expansion of the large motorways that surround 
the town and railway infrastructure, such as a double-track freight line from Rotterdam 
and the commencement of the High-Speed Line. 
 
3.6. The socio-political context 
In the Netherlands, CCS became a seriously considered CO2 abatement option in 
Dutch climate and energy policy in 2007, as part of the ‘Clean and Efficient’ policy 
package. As a result, the Dutch Government provided a budget for several research 
projects, including the implementation of four capture and two storage projects by 
2012. According to the National Government, CCS is needed because other low 
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carbon energy alternatives are not yet ready. This claim has been contested by others 
who question the effectiveness of CCS as a climate mitigation measure and who argue 
that there are already better alternatives available. Nevertheless, project development 
in Barendrecht has not been preceded by an organized discussion about the utility and 
necessity of CCS. 
In Germany, the federal government as well as some of the German Bundesländer 
have promoted several CCS projects over the past few years. The federal government 
is financially supporting two projects on carbon storage, CO2Sink at Ketzin and the 
CLEAN-project (Altmark, Sachsen-Anhalt). Industry (Vattenfall, RWE, EnBW and 
E.On) has been very active and is running several CCS projects. However, Germany 
does not yet have legislation on CCS, i.e. Directive 2009/31/EC has not been 
transposed into national law as of late 2011, a fact that could limit the commercial 
deployment of the technology. Public awareness and knowledge of CCS are low in 
Germany and so it is difficult to reliably estimate levels of public acceptance. Similar 
to other European countries, people in Germany prefer renewable energy sources to 
fossil sources and nuclear energy. 
The Spanish Government has supported research on CCS technologies through 
Research and Development programs and the creation of Ciuden. Energy companies 
have invested in CCS technologies, but currently only Endesa is involved in a CCS 
demonstration project as a part of the Compostilla project. Although some 
environmental NGOs have opposed CCS technologies, CCS projects have not been 
subject to controversy in the national or regional contexts. Public awareness is 
generally low [71]. In a political context dominated by the economic crisis and job 
losses, the potential economic benefits of CCS projects may be influencing local 
debate. 
In Poland, the policy and political context is arguably not favourable for CCS. 
While in recent years, strong political signals have been sent in favour of developing 
nuclear power and exploiting shale gas, a similar positive message is missing for CCS. 
One of the reasons for the lack of enthusiasm for CCS is its high construction and 
exploitation cost. The government has not yet committed any state funding to 
developing CCS in Poland. According to the Eurobarometer survey of 2011 there is 
poor knowledge on CCS in Polish society. However, more than half of respondents 
think that fossil fuels will still be used as energy sources in the future, that CCS will 
help in combating climate change and that it should be compulsory for new coal power 
plants [71]. Regarding the local socio-political context, in autumn 2010 local elections 
coincided with the investigation phase of Polish CCS projects. Several local 
politicians addressed CCS in their election campaigns and tried to gain political capital 
by amplifying risks of carbon storage, again suggesting an undercurrent of local 
concern. 
 
3.7. General inferences 
Despite cautioning against expectations of any comprehensive theoretical clarity in 
this context, there are some discernible patterns of success and failure in European 
CCS siting to date. A project is more likely to generate a positive community reaction 
if it is at a research-scale; if it is led by a public research organization with well- 
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established and trusting community relationships; if the promoters develop a proactive 
and honest engagement strategy; if trusted experts are involved in the project; if the 
potential benefits are seen as outweighing the potential risks; and if the storage project 
is located in an area of low population density with a positive relationship with the 
fossil fuel industry. Simplifying, three issues can be said to be of particular relevance 
in terms of local reactions to CO2 storage projects: trust in the developer, the quality 
of public engagement activities and public and stakeholder perceptions of the need for 
the facility. 
The cases studied suggest that the existence of trusting relationships among the 
local community and promoters may facilitate the potential for progress of the project. 
CCS projects led by research organizations have benefited from greater perceived 
trust. Public research organizations and scientists usually benefit from higher 
perceived honesty, competence, empathy and commitment, as seen in Ketzin and 
Hontomín. On the contrary, industries promoting CCS projects face initial lower levels 
of trust, as seen in Barendrecht and Beeskow. As Europe slowly moves forward with 
larger-scale deployment of CCS, all these factors will remain critical to its success. 
Trust in developers alone, however, may not be sufficient to generate a positive 
community reaction to a CCS project. For all successful sites, and as shown in similar 
studies [52], potential benefits need to be seen as outweighing potential risks. CCS 
may or may not be considered a good option to tackle climate change by individuals 
and social groups, but in the siting context, local communities need to perceive the 
need for the facility in the local community or its potential benefits to the community 
[33, 26]. In the cases studied, small scale R+D CO2 storage projects were generally 
associated with various benefits to the local community (tourism development, higher 
prestige, future investments in the local community) while commercial projects were 
fundamentally associated by the local communities with potential costs and risks. 
Regarding the role of engagement activities, the cases show that an effective public 
engagement strategy is a key element in a successful development. An effective 
engagement meets the needs of the community, is initiated early in the process, is 
proactive, and is integrated with the technical activities. The local public, local 
politicians, the media, influential individuals and representatives from local 
organizations may oppose the project if they are surprised by the project, or feel that 
they have not been involved in the process and their views have not be taken into 
account. Early, informal engagement, commitment to take into account stakeholders’ 
and public views as well as a coordinated management strategy among partners are 
also significant elements in an effective engagement. 
However, engagement does not guarantee success as broader policy issues and 
prior attitudes are likely to affect deployment. As shown in Beeskow, engagement 
activities do not automatically generate the local acceptance of a project perceived as 
not needed, or where community relationships have not been built. This has been also 
found in studies of CCS siting in the American context [52]. Engagement activities 
can result in many positive outcomes, from integration of a broader knowledge base 
to community support or social learning [72], but it is difficult to assume that all 
disputes can be overcome through engagement, or that trust in promoters is 
automatically enhanced [73]. 
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Regarding the socio-political context, the cases show that the local debate around a 
CO2 storage project may be influenced by broader policy issues. The existing policy 
support to CCS, the debate around the perpetuation of the coal industry, the potential 
conflicts between CCS and renewables, the general public perception of large energy 
companies or the economic crisis and job destruction may have somehow played a role 
in community reactions to the proposed projects. Regarding the actions of the 
stakeholders, we have seen that environmental NGOs, local policy makers, residents’ 
associations and the media have influenced the public controversy around the CCS 
projects in Barendrecht, Beeskow and Belchatów. Opposition by local actors may have 
eroded public trust in these projects. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Understanding the factors involved in community reactions to CO2 storage projects is 
an important but difficult endeavour. Explanations that focus on one single factor (e.g. 
NIMBY explanations) tend to simplify the system of causal relations and overestimate 
the role of some factors. The case studies considered in this paper underline the need 
to consider the diversity of factors in relation to CO2 storage projects. While 
theoretical perspectives are always useful for their ability to provide new 
understanding and ways of thinking, typically they are partial in the range of factors 
considered. In multi-factorial, complex contexts, where diversity between cases is 
common and conditions are not controllable, it can be as useful - in terms of aiding 
understanding - to cluster factors by level or agent. 
Hence we have classified the main factors involved in community responses to 
CCS into six broad areas: the characteristics of the project; the engagement process; 
the public perceptions; the actions of the stakeholders; the characteristics of the 
community; and the socio-political context. All of these elements can influence the 
probability of generating a negative local reaction to a siting process. But no factor 
alone can guarantee success or failure in siting, as the effects are contingent, 
probabilistic, inter-related (e.g. a pilot research project may increase the perceived 
benefits of the facility, generate a more open attitude from project promoters that, in 
turn, may increase trust and decrease the opposition by some stakeholders) and 
potentially compensatory - for example, an effective engagement strategy may help 
overcoming an initially wary relationship. 
Along with the need to consider technical and geological criteria in site selection, 
non-technical aspects such as those analysed in this article should be considered and 
incorporated into the site selection and management of CCS projects. The successful 
deployment of CO2 storage projects will be influenced by various technical and non 
technical factors. Social characterization, used ethically, may allow identifying 
potentially receptive communities and improve collaboration with communities [52]. 
The long-term vigilance in managing the CO2 introduces new technical and 
management challenges. A socially robust management of CCS storage projects is 
likely to lead to more acceptable outcomes as well as a more productive and 
sustainable practices. 
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